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DAMAGES AND DAMOCLES: THE PROPRIETY OF
RECOUPMENT ORDERS AS REMEDIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
David T. Raimer*
INTRODUCTION

In June 2006, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa handed down its decision in Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries.1 The case
involved the constitutionality of a faith-based prison rehabilitation
program, which, while operated by a private organization (Prison Fellowship), was funded in part by public monies. 2 Notably, the party
bringing suit was the eponymous public interest group-not the State
of Iowa. Had the court simply found the program violated the Establishment Clause-which it did-the case would have received little
attention. Courts had previously found similar programs to be unconstitutional with little fanfare.3 At most, concerned parties on the left
and the right would have viewed the case respectively as either
upholding the doctrine of strict separation between church and state
or as yet another example of a concerted effort to banish religion
from the public square. Judge Pratt, however, did more than declare
the program unconstitutional. In addition to enjoining the continued
operation of the program, 4 the court also filed a recoupment order,
requiring Prison Fellowship to repay over $1,500,000 to the State of
Iowa. 5 The order was unprecedented. 6 Never before had a federal
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., Political
Science, Pepperdine University, 2004.
1 (Ants. United 1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006), afrd in part, revd in part,
509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).

2 See id. at 864-66.
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 194-95 (Tex. 2001).
4 See Ams. United I, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
5 Seeid. at 941.
6 Prior to this case, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, discussed infra Part I.B, had indicated that restitution was a viable remedy under the
Establishment Clause. See Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 934-36 (7th Cir.
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court required "a private party, at the behest of another private party,
to reimburse the public treasury when the government itself ha[d]
not sought reimbursement" for a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 7 While this particular recoupment order was eventually overturned on appeal, the reviewing court did not preclude the use of
such orders in future cases.8 Moreover, at least one other circuit has
indicated that recoupment is indeed a valid remedy.9
This Note argues that the use of such recoupment orders in the
context of the Establishment Clause is not only constitutionally questionable, but also ill-advised from an equitable perspective. While the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion Foundation, Inc.10 marginally cabins the application of this remedy to legislatively appropriated funds, a very real potential for abuse remains.
Hein's limiting effect notwithstanding, the doctrine articulated by the
district court in Americans United I and by the Seventh Circuit in Laskowski v. Spellings" hangs a veritable sword of Damocles over religious
groups that receive public funding, essentially forcing them to wager
their existence on their understanding of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Part I contains a synopsis of the taxpayer standing doctrine articulated in Flast v. Cohen,12 and a brief recitation of cases in which it has
been used to seek restitutionary relief. Part II addresses the relevant
constitutional issues, first questioning whether actions for reimbursement of funds to a government treasury can properly be brought
under Flastand then assessing the suitability of this remedy in light of
concerns regarding the separation of powers and federalism. Part III
discusses the equitable considerations involved in using restitution as
a remedy for a violation of the Establishment Clause, and proceeds to
detail the potential deterrent effect recoupment orders could have on
faith-based organizations who seek public funds in order to provide
2006), vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051
(2007). However, the court did not actually grant restitutionary relief, but rather
remanded the case back to the district court. Id. at 939.
7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5-6,
Ars. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc.
(Ams. United 11), 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2741), 2006 WL 3098141 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
8 Ams. United II, 509 F.3d at 426-28. The Eighth Circuit held that there was
indeed an Establishment Clause violation, but concluded that the district court had
abused its discretion in ordering restitutionary relief. See id. at 423-28.
9 See Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 934-36.
10 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007); see infra Part II.A.1.
11 443 F.3d 930; see infra Part I.B.
12 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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social services. Part IV concludes with the assertion that if recoupment orders are not stricken from the list of remedies for Establishment Clause violations, at the very least, courts should provide a safe
haven akin to qualified immunity for religious groups who contract
with government entities.
I.

THE HISTORY OF RESTITUTION AS A POSSIBLE REMEDY FOR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS

Until recently, the thought of using restitution to remedy an
Establishment Clause violation was unheard of. Bringing such an
action in the form of a private taxpayer suit would have been even
more unthinkable. In fact, even now "restitution [] hardly figures into
constitutional remedies at all." 1 3 This is largely due to the simple fact
that for nearly two hundred years of our nation's history, taxpayers
lacked standing to bring suit for a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 14 The Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in Flast dramatically
15
altered this landscape.
Flast arose from a request to enjoin the expenditure of federal
funds received by religious schools.' 6 The schools used these funds to
finance educational programs and purchase schoolbooks, allegedly in
violation of the Establishment Clause. 17 Initially, the lower courts
18
ruled that the taxpayers bringing suit lacked standing to proceed.
With Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority, the Supreme

Court reversed, finding an exception to the general rule against tax13 Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityResurrected?: Does a RecalibratedIrreparableInjury
Rule Threaten the Warren Court's Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1343, 1353 n.40 (2002); see also Bradley Thomas Wilders, Note, Standing on Hallowed
Ground: Should the Federal Judiciary Monitor Executive Violations of the Establishment
Clause?, 71 Mo. L. Ruv. 1199, 1218 n.158 (2006) (noting that "refund[s]" are "rarely
sought in Establishment Clause cases").
14 Taxpayers' lack of standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute was confirmed in Frothinghamv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). It has always been
understood, however, that the government could seek restitution for improperly
obtained government funds. "Congress... is the custodian of the national purse....
[I]t is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And
these comprehend . . . securing the treasury or the government against financial
losses however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries .. " United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 314-315 (1947).
15 See Debra L. Lowan, A CallforJudicialRestraint:Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging Executive Action, 30 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 651, 654 (2007) (noting that in Past,

"the Court reversed over four decades of standing jurisprudence and for the first time
backpedaled ... and created a separate standing doctrine for certain taxpayer suits").
16 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
17 See id. at 85-86.
18 See id. at 88.
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payer standing. The Court set out a two-part test, stating that first,
taxpayers "must establish a logical link between [their taxpayer] status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked." I9 For the Court's purposes, this means that "a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the
unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the
taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution." 20 Second, "taxpayer[s] must establish a nexus between [their taxpayer] status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged."'2 '

The Court clarified that this requires the taxpayer to

"show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally
beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8."22 Finding
the Establishment Clause to be a "specific constitutional limitation"
on Congress' power to tax and spend, the Court granted taxpayers
23
standing to sue for its violation.
Even with the ruling in East, however, there have been few cases
24
in which taxpayers have sought restitution to a government treasury.
Indeed, "[w]hile ...

restitution orders are fairly common in govern-

ment contract law... those orders are highly unusual in cases involving the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. ' 25 The few cases
addressing the question are discussed below.
A.

American Jewish Congress v. Bost

American Jewish Congress v. Bost 2 6 appears to be the first case in

which the issue of restitution was discussed in a taxpayer suit. Plaintiffs challenged a contract between Texas and a nonprofit group of
businesses and churches under the state's Charitable Choice program. 2 7 The complaint alleged that the $8000 grant involved had
19 Id. at 102.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 102-03.
23 See id. at 103.
24 However, " [ t ] here is no per se rule that the recipient of illegal funds who has
spent them cannot be forced to repay them through a restitution order." 42 C.J.S.
Implied Contracts § 11 (2007).
25 Claire Hughes, Embattled Christian Prison Program Asserts Its Legality, ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE POL'Y, Oct. 10, 2006, http://www.religionand

socialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=5221.
26
27

37 F. App'x 91 (5th Cir. 2002).
See Am. Jewish Cong. v. Bost, No. A-00-CA-528-SS, 2002 WL 31973707, at *1

(W.D. Tex. July 16, 2002).
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been used to purchase Bibles and sponsor religious instruction in connection with the faith-based group's job training program. 28 Since
the suit was not brought until after the funds had been expended and
the contract had not been renewed, 29 the district court mooted the
plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 30 As the case
was moot, the court did not consider the plaintiffs request that the
funds expended be returned to the public treasury. While the Fifth
Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision on the declaratory and
injunctive claims, in a two-paragraph unpublished per curium opinion, it nonetheless remanded the case for a consideration of whether
restitutionary relief would be proper. 3 1 The implications of the
court's decision to consider restitutionary relief even where the
32
underlying claim was moot would later be made plain in Laskowski.
On remand, the district court, in a brief opinion, "wholly
reject [ed]" the plaintiffs claim for recoupment,3 3 finding "no case law
to support plaintiffs' tenuous position that taxpayer standing allows a
suit for the damages plaintiffs seek. '34 The court based its ruling
largely on standing grounds, distinguishing F/ast by noting that it had
dealt only with prospective injunctive relief. 35 Moreover, the court
noted that even if the plaintiffs did have standing, an order for
recoupment should not be issued when the relief sought is essentially
de minimis. 36 In a footnote, the court elaborated: "To mix metaphors, plaintiffs are attempting to place an imaginary cart before a
pygmy horse (after all, the total contract was only $8,000 dollars out of
[a] state budget of over $41 billion in fiscal year 1999) that has long
37
since left the barn."

B.

Laskowski v. Spellings

Bost appeared to be nothing more than a blip on the radar screen
of Establishment Clause case law. However, Laskowski signaled what
has the potential to be a sea change in First Amendment jurisprudence. Laskowski originated as an attempt to prevent Secretary of
Education Margaret Spellings from issuing a grant to the University of
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See id.
See id.
See Bost, 37 F. App'x at 91.
See id.
See infra Part I.B.
Bost, 2002 WL 31973707, at *3.
Id. at *2.
See id.
See id. at *3.
Id. at *3 n.4.
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Notre Dame. 38 The $500,000 grant was specifically earmarked by
Congress to fund the Alliance for Catholic Education (ACE), a training program for teachers in Catholic schools.

39

The taxpayers bring-

ing suit alleged that ACE's religious components violated the
Establishment Clause. 40 As was the case in Bost, since the one-time
grant had already been expended, prospective injunctive relief was
impossible. The district court accordingly dismissed the case as moot,
41
finding that no meaningful relief could be granted.
The Seventh Circuit, however, vacated the district court's ruling
with Judge Posner writing the opinion. 42 Though the plaintiffs had
not asked for restitutionary relief, the court raised the issue sua
sponte. 43 Noting that "we cannot think of any reason why such relief
should not be possible," the court went on to indicate that
"[r]estitution is a standard remedy... in public-law as well as privatelaw cases." 44 Indeed, the court argued that restitution had to be a
remedy available under the Establishment Clause. Otherwise, the
court hypothesized, Congress could authorize direct aid for proselytization and the Treasury Department could disperse the funds the
next day. 45 In such a scenario, plaintiffs would not be able to obtain
an injunction in time to halt the expenditure of federal funds for
46
patently unconstitutional purposes.
38 See 443 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre
Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007).
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 Id. at 939.
43 Id. at 941 n.1 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Brief for the Federal Respondent at 6,
Notre Dame, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (No. 06-582), 2006 WL 3609968 (noting that the Seventh
Circuit's "extraordinary ruling" was made "without the benefit of briefing or argument on the question by the parties").
44 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 934 (majority opinion).
45 See id..
46 See id. The dissent responded by arguing that political safeguards were more
than sufficient to address such an implausible situation, noting that there would
clearly be electoral consequences for any politician who took such action. See id. at
946 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("The hypothetical is far-fetched. Assuming such a flagrandy unconstitutional appropriation could escape notice during the entire Article I
lawmaking process, any congressman or senator who voted for it would have some
serious explaining to do in the next election cycle after it was discovered. The checks
and balances of the ballot box are an effective disincentive against such unlikely and
obvious congressional misuses of taxpayer money. Separation of powers requires the

judicial branch to assume the general competence of Congress to enact laws that are
constitutional.").
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With restitution on the table, the court then considered how such
a remedy could be implemented. As indicated previously, the government has always been authorized to seek reimbursement for funds
received illegally. 4 7 Moreover, executive branch officials are generally
authorized by statute to seek restitution for grant monies spent in an
unconstitutional manner. 48 However, an executive branch agency has
unreviewable discretion as to whether to take such enforcement
action. 49 As Secretary Spellings had no desire to pursue an enforcement action, the court could not order her to do so. Instead, Judge
Posner reasoned that the district court could "simply order Notre
Dame to return the money to the treasury." 50 The court analogized
the situation to "a case of money received by mistake and ordered to
be returned to the rightful owner," 51 dismissing Notre Dame's 52 argu-

ment that such relief would be improper because a private entity (the
University) cannot violate the Establishment Clause. 53 Since restitution was available, the case was no longer moot, as plaintiffs could now
recover some form of "meaningful relief' even if an injunction would
54
have no effect.
The court also briefly noted a variety of common law defenses to
restitution. Most notably, if the recipient of the "illegal" funds did not
"know[] or have ... reason to know" it was receiving funds in violation
of the Constitution and reasonably relied to its detriment on that
belief, the recipient would not be liable.5 5 As it did not decide the
case on the merits, the court did not rule on the reasonableness of
Notre Dame's belief in the constitutionality of its actions. 56
47 See supra note 14.
48 See, e.g., Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 934 (majority opinion).
49 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (noting that, for various reasons, "an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed
immune from judicial review").
50 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 934.
51
Id. at 934-35.
52 Notre Dame had voluntarily intervened in the case as a defendant. See id. at
933.
53 See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
54 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 934.
55 Id. at 936.
56 Following the Seventh Circuit's ruling, Notre Dame filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Univ. of Notre
Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007) (No. 06-582), 2006 WL 3043822. Four days
after its ruling in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007),
see infra Part II.A.1, the Court granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the opinion
below, and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of Hein. See Notre
Dame, 127 S. Ct. at 3051 ("Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated,
and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for
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C. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries
With the holding in Laskowski that "there is no per se rule that
the recipient of illegal funds who has spent them cannot be forced
to repay them, either in establishment clause cases or in any other
class of cases," 57 it was only a matter of time before a case arose
in which a court would order restitutionary relief. That case was
Americans United I-the first case in which a court, absent special circumstances,5 8 "ordered a faith-based group to repay monies to the
state or federal government after a finding that the payment was in
59
violation of the Establishment Clause."
As discussed earlier, Americans United brought the case as a challenge to a faith-based prison rehabilitation program created pursuant
to a contract between the State of Iowa and Prison Fellowship Ministries.60 In a lengthy and highly fact-specific decision, the court concluded that the program was "pervasively sectarian," and thus was
ineligible to be supported by government funds. 6 1 For the purposes
of this Note, the court's reasoning with regard to the remedy ordered
is of particular significance.
With the constitutional violation established, the court still had to
decide whether to award the restitutionary damages requested by the
plaintiffs. Not surprisingly, the court relied heavily on Laskowski in
further consideration in light of Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc." (citation

omitted)). Oral arguments before a Seventh Circuit panel were held November

5, 2007. See Laskowski v. Spellings, No. 05-2749 (7th Cir. Sept. 10, 2007) (docket).
57 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 936.
58 The case of Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia,637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980), is the

reason for the "absent special circumstances" caveat. In preparation for the visit of
Pope John Paul II, Philadelphia announced its plans to erect a platform upon which
the Pope could celebrate Mass. See id. at 927. A group of taxpayers brought suit on
Establishment Clause grounds. See id. "[T ]he parties stipulated to an order under
which construction was allowed to proceed, but the Archdiocese agreed to reimburse
the City for the cost of the platform and related construction should there be a final
judgment that the City could not constitutionally pay for the items." Id. at 927. The
expenditure was subsequently found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause,

and the Archdiocese was ordered to reimburse the city, per the terms of the agreement. See id. at 934.
59

Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Americans United for Separation of Church

and State (and Others) v. Prison Fellowship Ministries (and Others),
RELIGION & SOC.

ROUNDTABLE ON

WELFARE POL'Y, June 13, 2006, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.
org/legal/legal-update-display.cfm?id=49.
60 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
61 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 920 (S.D. Iowa 2006), affid in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.3d
406 (8th Cir. 2007).

2oo8]

DAMAGES

AND

DAMOCLES

1393

making this determination. 62 The question ultimately came down to
the reliance defense articulated in Laskowski. The court agreed with
Prison Fellowship that
"the propriety of relief.., must be measured against the totality of
the circumstances and in light of the general principle that, absent
contrary directions, state officials and those with whom they deal
are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state6 3statute, enacted in
good faith, and by no means plainly unlawful."
In an effort to demonstrate its reliance interests, Prison Fellowship pointed to the intricate nature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the complexity of the factual situation at issue (as
demonstrated by the fact that the case actually went to trial as opposed
to being resolved at the summary judgment stage), and its "good faith
effort" over the years "to comport with developing law." 64 Neverthe-

less, the court found several "compelling arguments" that "weigh [ed]
in favor of recoupment." 6 5 First, the court decided that the severity of
the Establishment Clause violation was "extraordinary." 66 Characterizing the program as an "intentional choice by the state of Iowa and
InnerChange to inculcate prisoners as treatment for recidivist behavior," the court noted that Prison Fellowship's "reliance on the esoteric
nature of Establishment Clause law can carry them only so far." 67 The
court also determined that while the "financial burden [the recoupment order would impose on] Prison Fellowship will not be insignificant .... it [would] not be unmanageable." 6 8 Finally, the complexity
of the case at hand failed to demonstrate that Prison Fellowship's reliance was reasonable. Given Prison Fellowship's access to competent
counsel and the fact that similar faith-based prison rehabilitation programs had been struck down, the court reasoned that the defendants
69
had sufficient notice that their conduct might be unconstitutional.
Thus, the court concluded that
[t] he type of constitutional violation here, the substantial nature of
that violation, the degree of knowledge of the Defendants about the
risk associated with the program, and the financial impact of the
judgment on the Defendants, taken together, outweigh the reliance
62
63
64
65
66
67

See id. at 938.
Id. at 939 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I), 411 U.S. 192, 209 (1973)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 939. "InnerChange" is the name given to the rehabilitation program

which operates under the auspices of Prison Fellowship. See id. at 871.

68
69

Id. at 940.
See id.
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InnerChange and Prison Fellowship had on the contract in this
70
case.
This holding, however, did not stand for long. Prison Fellowship

appealed to the Eighth Circuit and a three judge panel (including
former Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day O'Connor 71 ), unanimously
struck down the recoupment order. 72 The court found that the district court, while articulating the proper standard, 73 abused its discreion when applying that standard.7 4 In this case, there were specific
statutes on which Prison Fellowship validly relied that authorized its
funding. 75 There was no finding of bad faith on the part of Iowa, nor
could Prison Fellowship be considered to have had "clear notice

[that] the program was plainly unlawful." 7 6 Moreover, the lower court
70
71

Id. at 941.
See Tim Townsend, Ex-Justice O'Connoron Panel HearingPrison Ministry Case, ST.
Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 2007, at B5; see also Peter Slevin, Ban on PrisonReligious
Program Challenged, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2007, at A13 ("A trio of appellate judges,
including former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, is reviewing a lower
court's decision that the [Prison Fellowship] program violates the separation of
church and state."). Prison Fellowship's attorneys had requested reversal on standing
grounds in light of Hein. See Anne Farris, Controversial ChristianPrison Program Cites
Recent Supreme Court Ruling in Its Appeal ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE
POL'v, July 2, 2007, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/newsletters/article.cfm?
id=6699 ("'The Supreme Court has now vacated and remanded Laskowski to the 7th
Circuit with instructions to reconsider its ruling in the light of Hein,' stated a letter to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from Anthony Picarello, an attorney
from the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, who is representing InnerChange and
Prison Fellowship Ministries. 'Thus, the anomalous legal basis for allowing private,
taxpayer plaintiffs to compel restitution to the government is gone, and the decision
below granting that remedy should be reversed.'"). This request was not granted, as
the court found that essentially all of the taxpayer plaintiffs maintained standing,
even in light of Hein. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison
Fellowship Ministries, Inc. (Ams. United I1), 509 F.3d 406, 419-20 (8th Cir. 2007).
72 See Ams. United II, 509 F.3d at 426-28. The court did find, however, that Prison
Fellowship had been operating in violation of the Establishment Clause at the time of
the suit. See id. at 423-26.
73 See id. at 427 (taking into account "'the totality of the circumstances and
the general principle that, absent contrary direction, state officials and those with
whom they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute, enacted in
good faith and by no means plainly unlawful.'" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon
I/), 411 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1973))); supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74 Ams. United II, 509 F.3d at 428 ("Given the totality of the circumstances, the
district court abused its discretion in granting recoupment for services rendered
before its order.").
75 See id. at 427. The court indicated that Prison Fellowship's reliance was further
strengthened by the fact that "plaintiffs did not seek interim injunctive relief to prevent payment [of the state funds] during litigation." Id. at 428.
76 Id. at 427.
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failed to give due deference to state officials statements that the program was beneficial. 77 The recoupment order could not stand under
these circumstances. Significantly, however, the court nowhere dis78
avowed the use of such orders in future cases.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL. CONCERNS

By importing restitution into Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the cases discussed above raise a variety of constitutional issues.
If the doctrine formulated in Laskowski and Americans United I is not
repudiated, 79 it could mark a major shift in the manner in which constitutional violations are enforced. Even now, those cases have significant implications for traditional standing doctrine as well as basic
principles of separation of powers and federalism.
A.

The Flast Doctrine Does Not Extend to the Use of Restitution as a
Remedy

In the years since Fast was decided, it has proven to be a "limited
exception to the general rule that citizens lack standing to sue in federal court on generalized grievances about the conduct of government."8 0 Indeed, the Supreme Court "has steadfastly refused to
expand Flast and has never recognized private party repayment to the
Treasury as an appropriate remedy for an Establishment Clause violation in a suit based on taxpayer standing."8 1 The doctrine articulated
in Laskwoski and Americans United I, however, has the potential to lead
82
to a "dramatic expansion of taxpayer standing."
77 Id. at 427-28. These statements, the court stated, did not "insulate the prison
administrators' decisions from judicial review. However, in shaping equitable relief, a
court should consider the views of prison administrators, which oppose recoupment
in this case." Id. at 428.
78 See infta Part IV.
79 See supra notes 56, 71.
80 Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 2006) (Sykes,J., dissenting),
vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (noting the Court's
"narrow application" of F/ast in prior cases); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618
(1988) (remarking on the "narrow exception" created by Flast to the "general rule
against taxpayer standing"); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982) (discussing the "rigor with
which the Flast exception" should be applied).
81 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 939 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
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The Implications of Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion Foundation, Inc.

Before further analysis of the fit between traditional taxpayer
standing doctrine and restitutionary relief, a brief discussion of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hein is warranted. Hein began as
a taxpayer suit challenging various executive branch agencies' use of
funds in furtherance of President Bush's "Faith-Based Initiative." 83
However, all expenditures were drawn from general executive branch
8 4
appropriations-there was no explicit congressional appropriation.
This distinction proved decisive. Justice Alito, announcing the judgment of the Court, noted that "[t] he expenditures challenged in Fast
were funded by a specific congressional appropriation and were
disbursed . . . pursuant to a direct and unambiguous congressional
mandate."8 5 It was this "'logical link"' 86 that the Court found to be
...

"Cmissing" in Hein.87 last, the Court stated, allowed challenges "'only
[to] exercises of congressional power'" 8 8-in Hein, the "expenditures
resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action." 89 The
Court therefore concluded that F/ast stood only for the principle that
taxpayers had standing to challenge direct legislative appropriations 9 0-it did not allow taxpayers to do the same for funds distributed at the whim of the executive. 9 1
83 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2560-61 (plurality opinion). Like Laskowski, this case originated in the Seventh Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Posner. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433
F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553.
84 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560 (plurality opinion).

85

Id. at 2565.

86

Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).

87 Id. at 2566.
88 Id. at 2564 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982)).
89 Id. at 2566.
90 See id. at 2568. In a footnote, the Court indicated that informal legislative "earmarks" are not sufficient grounds for taxpayer standing. Specific statutory appropriations are required. See id. at 2568 n.7 ("Nor is it relevant that Congress may have
informally 'earmarked' portions of its general Executive Branch appropriations to
fund the offices and centers whose expenditures are at issue here. '[A] fundamental
principle of appropriations law is that where Congress merely appropriates lump-sum
amounts without statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear
inference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and
indicia in committee reports and other legislative history as to how the funds should
or are expected to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on the agency.'"
(alternation in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,
192 (1993))).
91

See infra notes 186-90.
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While this ruling insulates most participants in the White House's
Faith-Based Initiative from suit and potential recoupment orders,
there are still many organizations that receive government funds pursuant to congressional action. 9 2 Under Hein, these organizations are
93
still subject to suit by taxpayer plaintiffs.
Ultimately, while Hein is no doubt a landmark case in the area of
taxpayer standing, it is of limited relevance to the question at hand.
Hein dealt with the type of appropriationthat could be challenged--:it
did not purport to address the type of remedies available to a taxpayer
who successfully brought suit. However, by clarifying the scope of the
/ast doctrine, the Court did (albeit inadvertently) reduce the number
of faith-based organizations potentially subject to recoupment orders.
The case also signaled that in some Justices' minds, the very notion of
94
taxpayer standing rests on tenuous grounds.
2.

Taxpayer Standing Principles and Recoupment

Even when limited to challenges to legislatively appropriated
funds, the doctrine of restitutionary relief does not fit within the
Supreme Court's established taxpayer standing jurisprudence. It is an
92 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (plurality opinion) ("In short, this case falls outside
the the [sic] narrow exception that Flast created to the general rule against taxpayer
standing established in Frothingham. Because the expenditures that respondents challenge were not expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment, respondents' lawsuit is not directed at an exercise of congressional power, and
thus lacks the requisite logical nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative enactment attacked." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
93 For example, while the Court ordered the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its
ruling in Laskowski in light of Hein, see Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S.Ct.
3051, 3051 (2007) (mem.), its applicability is not immediately evident. Laskowski
involved a specific legislative appropriation. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 309, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-262 (earmarking "$500,000
for the University of Notre Dame for a teacher quality initiative"); Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated mem. sub nom. Notre Dame, 127 S.Ct.
3051. As Hein permits taxpayers to challenge disbursements "expressly authorized or
mandated by [a] specific congressional enactment," Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2568 (plurality
opinion), the plaintiffs in Laskowski would still appear to possess standing.
The situation in Americans United was slightly different. There, only a portion of
the funds were appropriated at the behest of the legislature. See Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries (Ams. United 1), 432 F.
Supp. 2d 862, 885-87 (S.D. Iowa 2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th
Cir. 2007). The remainder of the monies was dispensed to Prison Fellowship at the
discretion of executive branch agencies. See id. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit found
sufficient grounds to maintain taxpayer standing. See Ares. United II, 509 F.3d at
419-20 (8th Cir. 2007).
94 See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2573-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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elementary principle of law that before a court will exercise subject
matter jurisdiction to decide a case on the merits, the party bringing
95
the suit must have standing.
Constitutional standing requires, "at an irreducible minimum," that
the party invoking the court's authority "show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can
action and is likely to be redressed by a
be traced to the challenged
96
favorable decision."
The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate standing
"'separately for each form of relief sought.'" 9 7 In fact, a lack of jurisdiction is presumed prior to such a showing. 98 Thus in a taxpayer suit
for restitution, a plaintiff must show that she has standing to bring not
only a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause, but also that
she has standing to seek a recoupment order. While a taxpayer plaintiff can establish the former, she cannot demonstrate the latter.
At the most basic level, a plaintiff cannot show any injury which
can be redressed by a recoupment order. In Hein, Justice Scalia provides a helpful framework for understanding the type of "injury"
courts will find sufficient for taxpayer standing purposes. 99 "Wallet
Injury," he argues, "is the type of concrete and particularized injury
one would expect to be asserted in a taxpayersuit, namely, a claim that
the plaintiff's tax liability is higher than it would be, but for the allegedly unlawful government action."'10 0 Alternatively, the taxpayer
could attempt to claim an injury from the use of his tax dollars to
support religious indoctrination. Justice Scalia refers to this type of
"injury" as "Psychic Injury"-injury "consist[ing] of the taxpayer's

95 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) ("The 'core component' of the requirement that a litigant have standing to invoke the authority of a
federal court 'is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.'" (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992))).
96 Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 942 (Sykes, J. dissenting) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)),
97 Id. at 941 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)).
98 See DaimlerChrysler,547 U.S. at 342 ("'[W]e presume that federal courts lack
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record."' (quoting
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991))).
99 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring).

100

Id.
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mental displeasure that money extracted from him is being spent in an
unlawful manner."' 0
However, it is unclear how either injury is sufficient to establish
standing to seek restitutionary relief. "Wallet Injury" of this kind is
neither traceable nor redressable. 0 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
emphatically rejected the notion that such an injury is sufficient to
establish standing. In Frothingham v. Mellon,10 3 the Court held that a
taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the Treasury ... is shared with

millions of others [and] is comparatively minute and indeterminable.' 0 4 The effect of a purportedly unconstitutional act on an individual citizen's tax burden is too "remote, fluctuating and
uncertain"10 5 to rise to the level of the "actual injury" necessary for
standing purposes. 10 6 Nothing in Flast purports to give taxpayers an
interest in the public treasury. 10 7 To the contrary, "taxpayers in
[those] suits are not vindicating losses sustained by the Treasury."' 0 8
Assuming, arguendo, that "Psychic Injury" is sufficient grounds
for taxpayer standing, 0 9 restitutionary relief is still not proper. If taxpayer standing under Flast is designed to ensure "'that the taxing and
spending power [is not] used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general,'"110 plaintiffs can prevent this "'evil[]'"

by seeking prospective injunctive relief and consequently bringing the
unconstitutional action to a halt."' As Justice Scalia noted, "Psychic
Injury is directly traceable to the improper use of taxpayer funds, and
101
102

Id.

105

Id.

See id. ("It is uncertain what the plaintiffs tax bill would have been had the
allegedly forbidden expenditure not been made, and it is even more speculative
whether the government will, in response to an adverse court decision, lower taxes
rather than spend the funds in some other manner.").
103 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
104 Id. at 487.
106 See Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 943 (7th Cir. 2006) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (noting that "the effect of a congressional enactment on an individual citizen's
tax burden is too minute, and a taxpayer's interest in money in the Treasury is too
diffuse, to support standing to sue in federal court"), vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of
Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007).
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2575 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (" [W]e have never explained why Psychic Injury, however limited, is cognizable under Article III.").
110 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)).
111 Id.
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it is redressed when the improper use is enjoined."1 1 2 Elsewhere, the
Supreme Court has indicated that Fast is limited by its express terms
to curtailing the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending
power. 113 Taxpayer plaintiffs are allowed to seek an injunction to
curb the unconstitutional exercise of this power-their standing does
1 14
not extend to restoring any expended funds to the public treasury.
Indeed, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to seek a recoupment order once an injunction is obtained. Again, the injury sustained by the taxpayer in this scenario is the use of his tax dollars in an
allegedly unconstitutional manner. That injury is redressed by an
injunction preventing any future use of the funds in such a manner.
Any "Psychic Injury" to the plaintiff ceases at that point. Seeking a
recoupment order in addition to the injunction can do nothing to
redress the injury suffered. Once appropriated funds are expended
towards an allegedly unconstitutional purpose, the damage, so to
speak, has been done. A recoupment order cannot, for example,
erase the memory of those subjected to unconstitutional governmentsponsored proselytization. The bell cannot be unrung.
Even if a plaintiff could demonstrate actual injury of one form or
another, there is yet another reason why that injury could not be
redressed by a recoupment order. Just as the injury to the plaintiff
must be personal, the "redress" provided by the court must likewise be
personal. But in the case of a recoupment order, even if plaintiffs
were to succeed on the merits, the relief afforded would be reimbursement of the contested funds to the public treasury. 115 The plaintiff
derives no personal benefit from such action.1 1 6 Thus, restitution is a
particularly inapt remedy to "redress" the type of violation 1 7 at issue
in the Establishment Clause context. Indeed, standing of this sort
would empower "federal courts to adjudicate cases where plaintiffs are
suffering no injury and have no financial stake in a favorable resolu112 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring) (second emphasis added).
113 See DaimlerChysler,547 U.S. at 348 (indicating that taxpayer standing under
F/ast is limited to seeking "an injunction against" the " ' extract[ion] and spen [ding]'
of 'tax money' in aid of religion" (alteration in original) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at
106)); Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 943 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
114 See Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 943.
115 Contrast this to an action seeking an injunction. In that case, the injury to the
plaintiff is the unconstitutional exercise of the taxing and spending power. An
injunction halts that exercise, thus redressing the injury.
116 This is especially true in light of the Court's pronouncements on the lack of
individual taxpayer interest in the public treasury. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
117 Here, the unconstitutional exercise of the federal taxing and spending power.
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tion,"I 18 making a mockery of Article III's case or controversy
requirement.
B.

Separation of Powers and Federalism Concerns

Even assuming a taxpayer has standing to seek a recoupment
order in this arena, a variety of other considerations militate against
allowing such a remedy.' 19 From a constitutional perspective, perhaps
the most serious concern is the effect such a doctrine would have on
principles of separation of powers and federalism.
1.

Separation of Powers

In the federal separation of powers sphere, the court in Laskowski
correctly noted that the decision of whether to seek reimbursement to
the public treasury has traditionally been the province of the political
branches, specifically, the executive branch. Such decisions are
"immune" from judicial review. 120 In Heckler v. Chaney 2 1 the Supreme
Court noted that "an agency's refusal to institute [enforcement] proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which
has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive
Branch."1 22 The Court reasoned that this authority flowed from the
fact that "it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 123 Consequently, in
no circumstances could a court order an executive branch agency to
take enforcement actions seeking recoupment of funds.
Laskowski attempted to avoid this potential constitutional controversy by allowing courts to order the private party receiving the government funds to make restitution. 124 However, this effort to "cut[]
out the middleman"'125 does not alleviate the constitutional concern.
118 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 8.
119 Cf Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress'Powerto Block Enforcement of Federal Court
Orders, 93 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 24), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=997879 (noting that in addition to "develop[ing] justiciability doctrines in order to define and delimit the central prerogatives of the judicial Branch,"
federal courts have also "developed separation-of-powers principles that set the
parameters for the proper exercise of the judicial power").
120 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
121 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
122 Id. at 832.
123 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
124 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125 Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated mem. sub nom.
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S.Ct. 3051 (2007).

NOTRE DAME

1402

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

Indeed, the court itself noted that this shift was of no "practical significance." 126 The fact remains that the court is ordering the executive
branch to receive the proceeds of a de facto enforcement action.
Such a position allows courts to take an end run around Heckler any
time they see fit. By acting directly on the subject of the potential
enforcement action, courts could reduce executive discretion to a
mere apparition. The majority in Laskowski characterized such action
as a "routine instance[] of restitution,"' 127 but the dissent correctly
pointed out that "such an order would be neither simple nor routine.
In the context of a taxpayer suit alleging an Establishment Clause violation, such an order would be extraordinary and unprecedented."' 1 28
2.

Federalism

While separation of powers concerns prevent federal or state
courts from ordering their colleagues in their respective executive
branches from taking actions inherently discretionary in nature, principles of federalism likewise prevent federal courts from attempting to
order state political branches to take such action. Justice Thomas
articulated this point in the context of school desegregation in Missouri v. Jenkins,129 explaining that
what the federal courts cannot do at the federal level they cannot
do against the States; in either case, Article III courts are constrained by the inherent constitutional limitations on their powers.
There simply are certain things that courts, in order to remain
courts, cannot and should not do. There is no difference between
courts running [state] school systems or prisons and courts running
130
[federal] Executive Branch agencies.
Here, the question is not whether an executive branch agencyat the federal or state level-has discretion to allow unconstitutional
activity to continue. The question is whether the executive has discretion over the type of enforcement action it will pursue and the type of
remedy it will seek. If a state executive branch agency wants to seek
prospective injunctive relief rather than a recoupment order, a federal court cannot tell it otherwise. Principles of federalism constrain
the power of federal courts over state executives in this realm of dis126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 940 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
129 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
130 Id. at 132-33 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., Congressional
Power and State Court Jurisdiction,94 GEo. L.J. 949 (2006) (discussing potential constraints on Congress' "largely... unchecked" power over state courts).
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cretionary action. Again, just as separation of powers principles prevent federal courts from usurping what are essentially prosecutorial
functions of the executive branch, 3 1 principles of federalism prevent
them from doing the same to state executives.
This usurpation is perhaps most evident in Americans United L Far
from seeking recoupment, Iowa was more than satisfied with the services provided to it by Prison Fellowship. 13 2 Charged as a defendant
itself (and hence, on the losing side of the district court opinion),
Iowa also supported Prison Fellowship in its appeal. In doing so, the
author of the state's brief wryly pointed out the irony in the court's
action, noting that "[p] robably in no other case has the State 'lost' the
decision, but won restitution of all monies paid." 133 Iowa went on to
indicate, in no uncertain terms, that it did not want the money.
Rather than adhering to the state's wishes "[t]he . . . Court simply

order[ed] all monies returned, in direct contradiction to the unanimous testimony of finance officer Baldwin, former Warden Mathes,
current Warden Mapes, Deputy Warden Weitzell, and former Director
Kautzky."'

34

III.

EQUITABLE AND POLICY CONCERNS

In addition to the constitutional concerns discussed above, the
issuance of recoupment orders in the Establishment Clause context is
also problematic from an equitable perspective and in light of public
policy considerations. Such orders ultimately turn traditional com131 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
132 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
133 State Appellants' Brief at 49, Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc. (Ars. United I), 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (No.
06-2741), 2006 WL 2840607.
134 Id. at 49. The irony of a private actor trying to force a state to take money it
does not want was (perhaps intentionally, perhaps unintentionally) made apparent by
Justice O'Connor during the oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit in Americans
United II. As the lawyer for Americans United was beginning his argument, Justice
O'Connor interrupted him and inquired into the party he was representing. See Oral
Argument, Ams. United II, 509 F.3d 406 (No. 06-2741) (audio recording available at
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/; follow "Oral Arguments" hyperlink, then follow "Case
Number" hyperlink; search for "06-2741"; then follow "Play" hyperlink) ("You're here
representing Americans United for Separation of Church and State, not the state as
such ....

You're not here representing the state, as such?").

Ultimately, in reversing the recoupment order, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the
lower court had not given due deference to the opinions of state officials with regard
to the beneficial nature of the services rendered. See Ans. United II, 509 F.3d at
427-28. It did not, however, style its critique in terms of separation of powers or
federalism, deferring instead to the officials' expertise in the field of prison administration. See id.
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mon law restitution analysis upside down, while placing humanitarianminded religious organizations in an untenable position.
A.

Equitable Considerations

As Judge Sykes noted when dissenting in Laskowski, "[A] dapting
the common law doctrine of restitution to fashion a remedy in a taxpayer suit for an alleged Establishment Clause violation is like trying
to pound the proverbial square peg into a round hole." 135 The veracity of this statement is apparent from the anomalies this doctrine
creates.
1. Private Actors Cannot Violate the Establishment Clause
To begin with, Laskowski states that "restitution is among the rem-

13 6
edies that a federal court can order for a violation of federal law."

However, one must ask, what "federal law" has been broken? Perhaps
a better question is what federal law could have been broken. It could
not have been the Establishment Clause-at least, the faith-based
organization could not have violated the Clause. It is a basic principle
of First Amendment law that only the government can violate the
Establishment Clause. 137 If nothing less, this reality is evident from
the axiomatic notion that only a "state" can establish a "state" religion.
In taxpayer suits of the kind brought in Laskowski and Americans
United I, it is the government who has violated the Establishment
Clause.138
135 Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 941 (7th Cir. 2006) (SykesJ, dissenting),
vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007).
136 Id. at 935 (majority opinion).
137 See id. at 943 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("Such a claim [for restitution] is unknown
to the law, probably because private parties cannot be held liable for Establishment
Clause violations. The majority [casually] dismisses this rather fundamental objection
....

.).

138 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) ("[Tlhe 'injury'
alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending [is] the very
'extract[ion] and spen [ding]' of 'tax money' in aid of religion .... (alterations in
original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968))). This point raises additional implications in the area of standing. Since the government is the only entity
that can breach the Establishment Clause, it would seem evident that any attempt by
taxpayers to seek redress for the violation of the Clause should be against the government. However, if taxpayers are seeking restitution, such a claim is incoherent. The
government cannot reimburse itself-it is no longer in possession of the challenged
funds. The only possible remedy the court could order in such a scenario would be to
direct the government to seek restitution against a third party through its own
enforcement action. However, as discussed supra Part II.B, such an action would violate principles of separation of powers and federalism. The Supreme Court has long
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This raises one of the most glaring concerns in allowing recoupment orders in the case of Establishment Clause violations-such
orders completely ignore the fact that the faith-based group has done
no wrong. Indeed, in a very real sense, it is being severely penalized
(in the case of Americans United I, ostensibly to the tune of millions of
dollars) for committing a crime that, by definition, it cannot
commit.

13 9

held that if no remedy is available against the wrongdoer due to various constitutional
limitations (sovereign immunity, etc.), it will not adjudicate the case. See Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 18-19. As no redress is possible, the plaintiff
would lack standing to proceed. A court order acting directly on the third party does
not eliminate this constitutional infirmity. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying
text.
139 It is true that in Americans United I, the court-in a footnote-concluded that
Prison Fellowship was a state actor and thus subject to the provisions of the Establishment Clause. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship
Ministries (Ams. United]), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 865 n.3 (S.D. Iowa 2006), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 509 F.3d 406. As with the Seventh Circuit's ruling on the availability of
restitutionary relief in Laskowski, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, this issue
was decided though "[t]he parties did not actively litigate, at any stage of the case,
whether the Plaintiffs established that, under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, the challenged
actions of the private corporate Defendants, InnerChange and Prison Fellowship,
were committed under the color of law," Ams. United I, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 865 n.3.
The court nevertheless determined that
[t]he contractual agreement between InnerChange, Prison Fellowship, and
the Iowa Dept. of Corrections, and the executing of its terms is sufficient to
show that the Defendants engaged in a joint action for the purposes of
§ 1983. Additionally, the rehabilitative treatment provided by InnerChange
is a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state, thereby qualifying InnerChange's rehabilitation treatment as a state action under the
public function doctrine.
Id.
The court went on to note that the "counseling and security services" the faithbased group provided "within the confines of the Newton Facility" created "a relationship, from the perspective of the inmates, in which the differences between private
and state actions by InnerChange and Prison Fellowship [were] nonexistent." Id.; see
also id. at 919-20 ("InnerChange and Prison Fellowship, in this case, are not private
actors-they are state actors. As a state actor, InnerChange speaks on behalf of the
government. It is not simply another voice in a forum opened for a discussion of the
best rehabilitation programs for state prisoners ....
[A]s state actors, InnerChange
and Prison Fellowship employees cloak themselves in the mantel of government. As
providers of a state-funded treatment program, they are burdened with the same
responsibilities of any state employee: to respect the civil rights of all persons, including the First Amendment's prohibition on indoctrinating others in their form of religion." (footnote omitted)). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit was likewise persuaded that
Prison Fellowship was a state actor. Ams. United I, 509 F.3d at 421-23.
Traditionally, "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close
nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior
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Unjust Enrichment

The inequity is further compounded by the fact that, invariably,
or grant recipient will have provided the government
contractor
the
with valuable consideration in exchange for the funds. For instance,
in Americans United I, Iowa insisted that Prison Fellowship had provided it with essential services. In blunt terms, the state admitted, "we
got our monies [sic] worth-we got a lot of 'bang for the buck[]
140
Whether or not there was an Establishment Clause violavalue.' ,,

tion involved does not diminish the fact that at some level, the state
received secular services from the faith-based group ordered to make
restitution. To name just one example, in Americans United I, Prison
Fellowship had provided the state with training and counseling services for prisoners. The recoupment order took no notice of these
services rendered. 4 1 Thus, there is nothing stopping a government
entity from knowingly contracting with a private party in violation of
the Establishment Clause, receiving services from the private organiza,may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The Court has admitted that "no one fact can function as

a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient," id., but broadly speaking, state action may be found

when a
private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or
its agents. We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it
is controlled by an agency of the State, when it has been delegated a public
function by the State, when it is entwined with governmental policies, or
when government is entwined in [its] management or control.
Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Leaving questions as to the validity of the courts' assessment of Prison Fellowship's status to the side, at the very least, it is a limit case. One would be hard pressed
to find a similar "close nexus" between most faith-based organizations receiving public funds and the government. Such a ruling obviously does not speak to private
actors such as the University of Notre Dame, nor the host of other faith-based service
providers who operate at arm's length from the government and whose functions are
not traditionally "public." Indeed the Court has repeatedly held that neither entering
into a government contract nor the receipt of government funds de facto transforms
a private actor into a state actor. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010-11
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982). Ultimately, a finding
that a faith-based organization running a prison rehabilitation program is a state actor
does nothing to establish whether faith-based organizations providing, for example,
food to the homeless, counseling services, or educational facilities are engaging in
state action.
140 State Appellants' Brief, supra note 133, at 49.
141 When striking down the recoupment order, the Eighth Circuit cited the lower
court's failure to give due deference to state officials' opinions on the benefits of the
Prison Fellowship program. See Ans. United II, 509 F.3d at 426-28.
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tion, and then awaiting a taxpayer suit for reimbursement of the funds
expended. This notion becomes even more absurd when one considers that in the end, the government would have its money and the
benefit of the services rendered, but it would be in that position only
because it violated the Constitution.1 42 In essence, recoupment orders in
this context "reward the Government for its allegedly unconstitutional
behavior." 14 3 The government would, for all intents and purposes, be
judicially empowered to have its cake and eat it too.
To analogize to the realm of contract law, allowing restitution in
such a case is akin to a situation in which an individual hires a caterer
to provide food for a party, lets the caterer complete the task, and
then is reimbursed by the caterer for her failure to comply with local
health codes. At that point, the individual has his meal and his
money-and in the process found an exception to the rule that there
is no such thing as a free lunch.
It is for this reason that Judge Sykes noted that attempting to fit
the equitable remedy of restitution into Establishment Clause jurisprudence was ill-advised. 144 Restitution, by its very nature, is predicated on unjust enrichment. 14 5 In other words, restitution is "the
conferral of a benefit by the plaintiff on the defendant under circumstances in which the retention of the benefit would be unjust."1 4 6 In
this scenario, however, the faith-based group has not been unjustly
enriched-all funds received from the state are in fact used for the
benefit of the state. The only party that is potentially unjustly
enriched is the state-it receives all benefits provided by the faithto this area
based group free of cost. Hence, application of restitution
1 47
of law effectively "turn[s the] doctrine on its head."
Indeed, restitutionary relief in the Establishment Clause context
makes nonsense of the common law understanding of restitution.
The purpose of equitable restitution is "to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's possession. 1

48

In the

case of a recoupment order, the plaintiff does not have a right to any
142 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
143 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 2.
144 See supra note 135.
145 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, at 12 (1937).
146 Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2006) (Sykes, J., dissenting), vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007).
147 Brief of Defendants-Appellants Prison Fellowship Ministries & InnerChange
Freedom Initiative at 57, Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison
Fellowship Ministries, Inc. (Ams. United 1H), 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 062741), 2006 WL 2788099 [hereinafter Brief of Defendants-Appellants].
148 Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
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of the funds possessed by the defendant. 14 9 Even if the plaintiff did
have an interest in the money allocated to the defendant, clearly, no
"funds or property" are "restored" to the plaintiff. All monies are
returned to the public treasury. The plaintiff therefore fails to satisfy
the two most basic elements of a common law restitution claim. As
Judge Sykes indicated in Laskowski, "Such a claim is unknown to the
1 50

law."

3.

The Complexity of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

There are defenses to restitution, as Judge Posner noted in Laskowski, 1 5 ' and as Judge Pratt detailed in Americans United L.152 However, because these defenses are inextricably linked to the concept of
reliance, they can be insufficient when placed in the Establishment
Clause context. Due to the lack of clarity in Establishment Clause
153
jurisprudence, there is little to rely on in this area of law.
To say the least, the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is far from an "exact science" 154-a fact not lost on the Justices themselves. Justice Breyer has remarked that "in respect to the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses... there is 'no simple and clear measure which by precise application can readily and invariably demark
the permissible from the impermissible."'

1

55

Justice Thomas has

stated that "the incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application. All told, this Court's jurisprudence leaves courts,
149
150
151

See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
Laskowski, 443 F.3d at 943 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
See id. at 936 (majority opinion).

152

See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Minis-

tries (Ams. United 1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 935-41 (S.D. Iowa 2006), affid in part, rev'd

in part,509 F.3d 406. The Eighth Circuit eventually found a version of such a defense
persuasive on appeal. See Ams. United II, 509 F.3d at 426-28.
153 See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's FourEstablishment Clauses, 8 U.

J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) ("It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess-both hopelessly confused and deeply
contradictory. On a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even settle on one standard to apply in all Establishment Clause cases. At some point during the last ten
years, one or more of the nine Justices have articulated ten different Establishment
Clause standards. Many of the Justices have endorsed several different-and often
conflicting-constitutional standards. Justice O'Connor alone authored or signed
opinions that relied on five different (and again, often contradictory) standards for
PA.

enforcing the Establishment Clause.").
154 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) (plurality opinion).

155 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,

concurring)).
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governments, and believers and nonbelievers alike confused-an
156
observation that is hardly new."

This confusion in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is no less
evident when the Court specifically addresses funding to faith-based
organizations. For example, in the first Lemon case, 15 7 the Court
noted that "the line of separation [between permissible and impermissible allocations of funds], far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship."1 58 If the Supreme Court "can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law," 159 can one truly expect a faith-based organization
to do any better?
The situation in Americans United !is again illuminating. As noted

above, Prison Fellowship sought to rest its defense on its best understanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence at that time. The
court was not persuaded, pointing to a Texas case in which a faithbased rehabilitation program had been struck down. 160 Ironically,
this only further exemplifies what a "variable barrier" the Establishment Clause has become. In Williams v. Lara,16 1 the Texas Supreme
Court found a faith-based prison rehabilitation program to be unconstitutional. 162 However, Prison Fellowship's InnerChange program
was also operating in Texas at that time. Post-Williams, InnerChange
continued to operate "without legal incident."' 63 At least to a layman,
such a result might well indicate that Prison Fellowship's program
passed constitutional muster.
156 Id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 n.1 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Our jurisprudential
confusion has led to results that can only be described as silly."); Rosenberger v. Rec-

tor & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the Court's "Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(speaking of attempts "to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence").
157 Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon 1), 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
158 Id. at 614.
159 Id. at 612.
160
161

See supra note 3.
52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001).

162

Id. at 194-95. The Eighth Circuit found that this case was insufficient to put

Prison Fellowship on notice that its actions were "plainly unlawful." See Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc. (Ams. United II),
509 F.3d 406, 427 (8th Cir. 2007).
163 Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 147, at 56.
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A "ChillingEffect" on Faith-Based Organizations

From a policy perspective, there is every reason to believe that if
Laskowski and Americans United I stand, faith-based organizations will
be deterred from seeking government funding. Indeed, supporters of
the decision in Americans United I referred to the ruling as a "body
blow to so-called faith-based initiatives." 164 If that proves to be true,
the American public's access to a variety of invaluable and highly
respected social service providers will be jeopardized.
The contributions of faith-based organizations to civil society cannot be understated. The White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives has noted that while their actions often go
unnoticed, "faith-based grassroots groups play large and vital roles
everywhere."' 165 The services they provide are as diverse as the organizations which offer them. These groups can include "local congregations offering literally scores of social services to their needy
neighbors; small nonprofit organizations . . . created to provide one
program or multiple services; and neighborhood groups that spring
1 66
up to respond to a crisis or to lead community renewal.'
Many faith-based organizations are small nonprofits that rely
almost exclusively upon charitable donations for funding. In all likelihood, there are few that possess sufficient capital to survive a recoupment order of the magnitude issued in Americans United .1 6 7 A sum of

164

Press Release, Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Federal Court

Strikes Down Tax Funding of Iowa Prison Program (June 3, 2006), available at http://
www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=newsArticle&id=8245&security-1002&news_
iv ctrl=1941.
165 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED & CMTV. INITIATIVES, UNLEVEL PLAYING
FIELD 3 (2001) [hereinafter UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD], available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010816-3-report.pdf.

166 Id.; see also RAM A. CNAAN ET AL., THE NEWER DEAL 275-76 (1999) ("[R]eligious
organizations represent a major part of the American welfare system. Tens of
thousands of people in the Philadelphia area [alone] are being helped by all kinds of
programs, from soup kitchens to housing services, from job training to educational
enhancement classes. One can only imagine what would happen to the collective
quality of life if these religious organizations would cease to exist.").

167 The implications of the court's choice of words notwithstanding. See Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries (Ants. United
1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 932 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (using the term "coffers" twice), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 509 F.3d 406; cf Richard W. Garnett & Benjamin P. Carr, 10 GREEN
BAG 2D 299, 305 (2007) (suggesting that using the term "coffers" to describe the
financial accounts of faith-based organizations "demeans and distracts more than it
describes").
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that amount would dwarf the annual budgets of most faith-based
68
groups.'
Additionally, neither Laskowski nor the Americans United opinions
provide any readily apparent deadline beyond which an organization
may not be held liable for past expenditures.169 For example, had the
recoupment order stood, Prison Fellowship would have been forced
70
to repay funds it received over a period reaching back seven years.'
Laskowski sets perhaps a more disturbing precedent in that it dealt
with a one-time grant which had been long-since expended. 171 This
leaves open the potential for faith-based groups to find themselves
forced to repay funds spent years, or perhaps even decades, in the
past. When assessing whether or not to compete for a government
grant, there is no doubt that these considerations would factor into an
organization's decisionmaking process. When coupled with the difficulties already facing faith-based organizations seeking government
funds, 172 it is easy to see how such groups could choose to refrain

168 It is true that the court in Americans United Iconsidered the financial stability of
Prison Fellowship before ordering relief. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
However, the court failed to give any meaningful benchmark as to when a faith-based
group could demonstrate financial hardship sufficient to preclude a recoupment
order. Even in Americans United I, the court only looked at the organization's ability
to pay. It did not look at the potentially devastating impact such a payment could
have on the organization's normal operations.
169 Decisions such as these impose
a severe disincentive on religiously-affiliated institutions from receiving public aid, for fear that they may be haled into court many years later to return
the long-spent money, solely because a court determines that the public officials making the grant did not impose some unspecified level of "appropriate conditions" on it.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 56, at 10.
170 Ams. United I, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
171 See Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated mem. sub
nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007).
172 See Brief of Amici Curiae We Care America, Evangelicals for Social Action,
Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, and the Center for Public Justice in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Notre Dame, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (No. 06-582), 2006 WL 3449038 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae We Care America et al.] ("FBOs [faith-based organizations]
already 'often face serious managerial and political obstacles' to helping fulfill 'the
Nation's social agenda.' FBOs must wade through the bureaucratic red-tape that
accompanies government programs, jump through extra hoops because they are
faith-based, worry how their religious-based hiring policies will open them to liability,
and endure restrictions on their religious activities that are not prohibited by the
Constitution." (citation omitted) (quoting UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD, supra note 165, at
3)).
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from seeking funding rather than run the risk of finding themselves
173
liable for restitution years later.
Thus, under this line of cases, every time a faith-based organization accepts government funds, the group is essentially betting its exis174
tence on its understanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
At worst, this requires faith-based entities "to do the impossible: accurately predict when the government is violating the Establishment
Clause."' 175 At best, religious organizations are now forced to think
twice before seeking government funding for their charitable efforts.
In other words, those "who take faith-based funding may find that
they've made an expensive misjudgment if their faith-based funding is
1 76

challenged."

In the wake of Americans United I, several events occurred which
lend credence to this perception. In October 2006, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons officially canceled its request for proposals for a
faith-based prison rehabilitation program. 17 7 The program was origi178
nally intended to be adopted in as many as six federal prisons.
While the Bureau had suspended its request in May of 2006 following
a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality, the proposal was not definitively shelved until after the ruling in Americans United L1 79 The
Bureau did not comment on the reason for its withdrawal, but it is at
least plausible that its decision was motivated by the decision out of
Iowa. Not only is the constitutionality of faith-based prison programs
now increasingly in doubt, but there is also the possibility that fewer
faith-based groups will even be willing to risk participation in such
programs.
Moreover, there is evidence that plaintiffs are making use of the
doctrine articulated in Laskowski and Americans United . In August of
2006, a federal district court in Pennsylvania allowed a taxpayer suit to
proceed against a prison rehabilitation program similar to the one
173 This is not a theoretical exercise. Several faith-based organizations filed amicus briefs in the Notre Dame case asserting as much. See Brief of Amici Curiae We
Care America et al., supra note 172, at 6 ("The knowledge that a grant, once taken,
can be the subject of an action for restitution years later will likely make seeking
government funding for charitable work more trouble than it is worth for many
[faith-based organizations].").
174 A dubious prospect. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
175 See Brief of Amici CuriaeWe Care America et al., supra note 172, at 8.
176 Press Release, Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, supra note 164.
177

N.Y.

Neela Banerjee, Proposed Religon-Based Program for Federal Inmates Is Canceled,
TIMES,

Oct. 28, 2006, at All.

178

See id.

179

See id.
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challenged in Americans United 1.180 Notably, the taxpayer plaintiffs in
that case sought "monetary damages for the recoupment of the funds
used for religious purposes."'' l In its ruling, the court cited Americans
United !as one of the grounds for refusing to dismiss the case. 18

2

Simi-

larly, in an employment discrimination case pending in the Western
District of Kentucky, a plaintiff sought to amend her complaint in
order to pursue a recoupment order from a faith-based children's
home. 18 3 That order would have exposed the orphanage "to a liability
of somewhere from $30 to $100 million dollars.' 184 Needless to say, an
order of that magnitude would bankrupt that-or any other-faith18 5
based entity.
This trend jeopardizes executive and congressional policy
expressed in various statutes and Executive Orders. Congress has
l 86 passed legislation-most notably, the Charitable Choice Program
8
designed to make federal funding available to faith-based groups.'

7

President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative is likewise designed to ensure
that federal agency and department heads structure their grant programs in such a way that they "ensure equal protection of the laws for
180
181

See Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F. Supp. 2d 316 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
See id. at 319.

182 See id. at 321-22.
183 See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Thomas More Law Center in Support of Petitioner at 3, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S. Ct. 3051 (2007) (No. 06-582),
2006 WL 3462958.
184 See id. at 4 (emphasis added).
185 See id. The court, however, denied the plaintiffs motion to file an amended
complaint. See Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., No. 3:OOCV-210-5,
2007 WL 316992, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 2007). Notably, the court cited the excessive delay in filing, not the unavailability of the remedy as grounds for its decision. See
id.
186 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000) ("The purpose of this section is to allow States to
contract with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement.., on the same basis as any other
nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance
funded under such program.").
187 See, e.g.,
Community Services Block Grant Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (2000)
(indicating that in dispersing the grant funds authorized by the act, federal, state, and
local governments may not "discriminate against an organization... on the basis that
the organization has a religious character); Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 9858n(2) (2000) (indicating that nothing in the Act bars the
use of federal funding for "sectarian child care services"); Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000) (indicating
that religious organizations may receive federal grant monies under the Temporary
Assistance to Need Families program "on the same basis as any other private
organization").
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faith-based and community organizations"' 8 8 who seek to obtain those
funds. Post-Hein, it appears likely that participants in the Faith-Based
Initiative will be insulated from suit. 189 As the case law now stands,
however, faith-based organizations receiving legislatively appropriated
funds are still subject to taxpayer suit under Flast. 190 Only time will
tell, but participation in such programs by faith-based groups may very
well decline as few organizations will be willing to make their survival
contingent on what amounts to a constitutional roll of the dice.
Indeed, it was in the interest of the integrity of these programs that
the United States intervened as amicus curiae in the Americans United I
appeal. 191

These policy considerations may also give rise to constitutional
issues. The Supreme Court has suggested, in a similar context, that
those participating in government programs should not be forced to
proceed at "peril of having their arrangements unraveled if they act
before there has been an authoritative judicial determination that the
governing legislation is constitutional."' 192 In another area of First
Amendment law, the Court will consider striking down statutes that
might have a "chilling effect" on the freedom of speech. 19 3 One could
make a colorable argument that an analogous protection should
apply to scenarios akin to those presented in Laskowski and Americans
United L Just as speech may be chilled by indirect and undue burdens,
free exercise of religion may well be jeopardized by a sword of Damocles in the form of restitutionary liability.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

For the reasons discussed above, restitutionary relief is wholly out
of place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Its application violates basic principles of standing, separation of powers, and federalism; leads to the inequitable resolution of cases; and deters religiously
affiliated institutions from exercising their right to compete with
other organizations for federal funding. Courts would be best served
188 Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note
(Supp. V 2005).
189 See supra Part II.A.1.
190

See supra Part II.A.1.

191 See Brief for the United States, supra note 7, at 2-3. The United States also
expressed this concern in its brief in the Notre Dame case. See Brief for the Federal
Respondent, supra note 43, at 17.
192 Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I1), 411 U.S. 192, 207 (1973).
193 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-18 (1973); id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to reject any further use of these orders in the context of the Estab-

lishment Clause.
At the very least, if courts continue to find such remedies appropriate, faith-based organizations receiving government funds should
be afforded protections similar to those a state official would have in
the case of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 94-namely,
qualified immunity. Under that defense, "government officials performing discretionary functions [] generally are shielded from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."1 95 Even while permitting recoupment
orders to be issued, the Seventh Circuit suggested a similar defense in
Laskowski.196 In fact, the Supreme Court itself, when discussing the
reliance of private institutions on government contracts, hinted at

such a standard, indicating that reliance was reasonable so long as the
unconstitutional nature of the action was not "clearly foreshadowed" 19 7 or "plain from the outset." 198 By striking down the recoupment order in question while leaving the door open for identical

orders to be issued in the future, the Americans United II court took
several steps towards implementing such a regime, at least in the

Eighth Circuit.1 99
This defense should be available to the religious organization
regardless of whether or not it is found to be engaging in "state
action" for the purposes of § 1983.20 While the Supreme Court has
previously rejected the qualified immunity defense for private entities
194 At least one court has chosen to consider the faith-based organization receiving government funds a state actor. See Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries (Ans. United 1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 865 n.3
(S.D. Iowa 2006), affd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007); supra note

139.
195 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
196 Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting a possible
defense to restitution if the recipient of the funds did not "know[] or have ... reason
to know" that the action was unconstitutional), vacated mem. sub nom. Univ. of Notre
Dame v. Laskowski, 127 S.Ct. 3051 (2007).
197 Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 206 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106
(1971)).

198 Id. at 207.
199 See supra Part I.C. The court did allow for a type of good faith reliance test, but
it gave little specific instruction beyond requiring an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship
Ministries, Inc. (Aim.
200

United 1), 509 F.3d 406, 426-428 (8th Cir. 2007).

See supra note 139.
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engaging in state action,2 0 1 it has left open the possibility for a "good
faith" defense. 20 2 Whatever the name, a defense should be available
to a private organization receiving government funds when actions it
reasonably believed to be constitutional are challenged in court.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, if faith-based organizations are to continue to play a
role in providing social services to the public, they must be reassured
that they will not be held liable for their good faith actions. The Laskowski and Americans United line of cases undermine the ability of
these organizations to effectively participate in public affairs on a level
playing field. Eliminating the use of recoupment orders in the context of the Establishment Clause, or at a minimum, providing a qualified immunity-like defense, is the only resolution to this problem. As
the United States argued in its amicus brief in the Americans United I

appeal,
Just as government officials should not be forced to "stay their
hands until newly enacted state programs are 'ratified' by the federal courts" at the risk of "draconian, retrospective decrees," private
contractors or grant recipients should not have to forgo the opportunity to participate in government programs at the risk of the drastic and financially crippling remedy of recoupment should the
203
program later be held unconstitutional.

201 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (concluding that "private prison guards, unlike those who work directly for the government, do not enjoy
immunity from suit in a § 1983 case"); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992)
(holding that "qualified immunity ...is [not] available for private defendants faced
with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment
statute").
202 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413-14 (emphasizing the narrowness of its holding,
and refraining from ruling on a potential "good faith" defense); Wyatt, 504 U.S at 169
(leaving, "for another day," "the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983
liability ... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or
probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties
could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens").
203 Brief for the United States, supra note 7, at 12 (citation omitted) (quoting
Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 207-08).

